How Labor Markets Shape Views Towards Caregiving Immigrants: Evidence from the U.S. and Japan*

Margaret E. Peters[†], Rieko Kage[‡], Frances Rosenbluth[§] & Seiki Tanaka[¶]

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Abstract

Policymakers and others have argued that higher levels of immigration could increase women's labor force participation by freeing native-born women from care-giving duties. However, as we show in this paper, rigid labor markets – those that give workers one chance to land a long term contract with a strong company – can discourage families from consigning childcare to immigrants whose tutelage may not give children an early advantage in getting these coveted opportunities. From original, cross-national survey experiments in the U.S. and Japan, we find evidence for this human capital hypothesis. We also find evidence of indirect norm-creation. American and Japanese respondents prefer immigrants – and not just caregiving immigrants – who have values that align with each country's respective type of valued human capital.

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[†]Department of Political Science, UCLA, email: margaret.peters@polisci.ucla.edu

[‡]Department of Advanced Social and International Studies, University of Tokyo, email: kage@waka.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp

[§]Department of Political Science, Yale University, email: frances.rosenbluth@yale.edu

[¶]Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam & Yale University, email: seikitanaka@gmail.com

Introduction

Many Western democracies are sitting on a demographic time bomb: the aging population draws down public pension funds at a faster rate than a shrinking workforce provisions the public larder with payroll taxes. One potential group of additional workers are women, but they are often saddled with care-giving responsibilities for their children as well as for aging parents. Bearing a large care-giving burden forces many women to choose between family and career, thereby reducing the number of women who can hypothetically replace a retiring workforce.

Some countries have addressed this problem through generous public funding of care services, most notably in Scandinavia. Where public funding is not available, immigrant caregivers could potentially free native women from the burdens of family work and many European countries have in fact taken steps to encourage the outsourcing of domestic labor (Morel 2015). However, not all women are willing to entrust the care of their children and elderly relatives to immigrants. We point to winner-take-all labor markets as one source of hesitation. In countries with long term labor contracts in which workers lose seniority upon leaving one job and seeking another, the premium on getting the "right" job is extremely high: the first job, and the educational opportunities that increase the chances of getting it, constitute an important gateway to success. Native women in those countries are likely to be reluctant to consign the care of their children to an immigrant caregiver, especially those without native-level language ability, and instead choose childcare options with a heavy investment component. We also expect that the reluctance to hire immigrant helpers will be higher on behalf of children than of the elderly, because care-giving for the former involves both educational and physical components compared to only a physical component for the latter.

We test this argument with original, cross-national survey experiments from the U.S. and Japan. These two countries provide useful cases for this study because both countries exhibit

low levels of public day care spending relative to most developed democracies (Iversen and Stephens 2008), which limits the supply of affordable, public child care. At the same time, the two countries have strikingly different labor markets. Workers in Japan generally have one chance to grab hold of the corporate ladder, from the bottom rung, whereas fluid labor markets are the norm in the U.S.

Theory

Background

Among the graying populations of advanced industrial economies, Japan is one of the oldest, with median age of 46.5. The U.S. has a younger population (median age of 37.8) on account of somewhat higher immigration and fertility rates but nevertheless faces a demographic challenge in coming years. Older populations, who are often not active in the labor force, increase the costs of health care and the social welfare state without generating much in the way of tax revenue.

Governments understand that one way to expand the workforce is to increase the proportion of women who work outside the home. Women are discouraged from the labor market by, among other factors, social norms that assign to women the care of family members (Thévenon 2013). Given the disproportionate burden that women bear for family work, it is no surprise that the ability to outsource at least some childcare is a major driver of women's labor force participation. Using panel data in Europe, Del Boca, Pasqua and Pronzato (2008) find that a 10% increase in the availability of childcare would increase women's labor force participation by 53% to 67% for women with less than a college education and by 79% to 86% for women with a college education. Raz-Yurovich and Marx (2017) also reports, using Belgian data between 1999 and 2014, that state-subsidized outsourcing of domestic work significantly increased the percentage of highly skilled women in the workforce.

Some governments, typically in Scandinavia, offer generous public childcare services that make it possible for many women to continue work after childbirth. In the last few decades, France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands have also begun to incentivize domestic care work through various tax provisions (Morel 2007; 2015). According to Morel (2015), these countries initially sought to encourage the expansion of the domestic services sector as a means to promote employment growth but then more explicitly as a way to keep high-skilled women in the labor force. But women typically work fewer hours in societies with strong norms about a mother's responsibility for child-rearing (Fernandez and Fogli 2005). Norms also shape the criteria for sizing up substitute care givers. For example, in many Southern European countries, parents often choose a relative – especially grandmothers – to take care of their children rather than use public childcare (even if it is available and inexpensive) in deference to norms about the importance of having a mother at home (Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri 2005).

Women also tend to care for the elderly on top of their childcare responsibilities and this burden is increasing as people live longer (Smith 2004). Even when they have brothers who could share the caring work, women disproportionately care for aging spouses, their own parents, and their in-laws including in countries like the U.S. with weaker norms regarding care for the elderly (Smith 2004). This burden is likely to be greater still in countries with potent norms about the role of women as family caregivers. Like childcare, the gendered nature of elder care causes many women, but not as many men, to drop out of the labor force or at least reduce their hours (Ettner 1996).

As with childcare, one of the factors that mediates the effects of elder care on women's labor force participation is the availability of care. With the move away from institutionalization of the elderly, there has been a concomitant increase in informal care for the elderly by female relatives, in part because there are no other institutions to help with this work (Morel 2007). Instead, much elder care has become privatized (or remained private), which has resulted in costly private care or in women dropping out of the labor force to look after

elderly relatives. One American study finds that women who care for their aging parents over a two-year period cut back on their work by an average of 367 hours a year, or, on average, 41% (Johnson and Lo Sasso 2006). In some countries, this move has come with subsidies for informal care, which while recognizing and rewarding women's unremunerated family work, nonetheless moves this work from the formal sector to the informal sector. In other countries, there is still publicly provided or at least subsidized care, but the insufficiency of providers often leads to long waiting lists.

One policy measure to alleviate women's family burden would be to increase the inflow of immigrants, which would increase the supply and reduce the cost of caregiving. As Western European countries have expanded their domestic services markets, they have found that most of the jobs have been taken up by immigrants rather than natives, and most of them women (Simonazzi 2009). On the care sector more specifically, many countries have begun to encourage immigration by creating special immigration programs for health care providers or increasing the number of these visas. However, these programs typically only support the health care of elderly individuals, not day-to-day care, and few of these programs address childcare.

Demand for Outsourced Care: Existing Perspectives

A growing literature on the outsourcing of domestic work focuses specifically on care (Estévez-Abe 2015; Estévez-Abe and Hobson 2015; Morel 2007; 2015; Shire 2015; Carbonnier and Morel 2015; Jokela 2017).[1] Most of these studies have focused on Western European countries (Simonazzi 2009; Brennan et al. 2012; Shutes and Chiatti 2012), but recent studies also examine the outsourcing of care in East Asian democracies as well (Oishi 2005; Ford and Kawashima 2013; Michel and Peng 2012; Song 2015).

Empirical evidence, principally from Western Europe, tracks the growth of outsourcing of

[1] In practice, it may be difficult to make a clean distinction between care and non-care domestic work (Estévez-Abe and Hobson 2015).

domestic services, including care (Morel 2007; 2015; Carbonnier and Morel 2015; Shire 2015), and the impact of domestic services on inequality within the labor market (Carbonnier and Morel 2015; Hellgren 2015; Jokela 2017). Recent work has also begun to explore systematic differences in care-giving markets. For instance, some countries rely on immigrants more than others; in some of the countries, these workers are given some employment protection and social benefits, while in others they are not (Simonazzi 2009; Michel and Peng 2012; Estévez-Abe and Hobson 2015; Song 2015). In addition, outsourcing domestic work has been credited with greater women's employment, higher fertility, less time spent on housework, and less subjective time pressure (Van der Lippe, Tijdens and De Ruijter 2004; Craig and Baxter 2016; Raz-Yurovich 2016; Raz-Yurovich and Marx 2017).

Demand for domestic household services comes from workers who have less available time, work longer hours, have younger children, and earn higher incomes (Oropesa 1993; Cohen 1998; Van der Lippe, Tijdens and De Ruijter 2004; Treas and De Ruijter 2008; Baxter, Hewitt and Western 2009; De Ruijter and Van Der Lippe 2009; Van der Lippe, Frey and Tsvetkova 2013; Estévez-Abe 2015; Shire et al. 2017). Yet another group of studies views the outsourcing of household services as a negotiated outcome between spouses and points to the bargaining power of wives relative to husbands, as measured by income levels and occupational status of each (Cohen 1998). This poses a catch 22 for women: unless they already earn an independent income, they may not be able to convince their spouses to spend money to outsource family work. While these studies focus primarily on individual- or family-level variables, recent work by Estévez-Abe (2015) draws on ISSP data to find that national-level variables, such as higher percentages of low-skilled immigrants and low-skilled workers more generally, impact whether families or individuals choose to outsource housework.

We build on these studies in four ways. First, while most studies examining demand for outsourcing domestic services have typically drawn on survey data from single countries (for an exception see Estévez-Abe (2015)), this study adopts a cross-national design, which

allows us to examine the impact of both national-level and individual-level variables on the willingness to outsource. Second, while care comprises a large portion of outsourced domestic services, existing studies have not examined why the willingness to outsource may vary across different types of care: childcare or elderly care. Third, standard survey responses on whether individuals have outsourced or would be willing to outsource care services may be affected by social desirability bias, especially in countries where traditional gender norms are strong. We seek to overcome this bias by employing conjoint experiments. Fourth, we offer a novel argument about how a consideration about particular kinds of human capital affect what values are considered most desirable in caregiving immigrants.

Theoretical Framework

A potential problem with hiring immigrants to help bear the burden of family work is that individuals may be averse to shirking a perceived duty. Baxter, Hewitt and Western (2009) shows, on the basis of Australian survey data, that whether or not individuals make use of paid domestic labor is contingent on whether they think it is appropriate. But controlling for the general willingness to outsource the family work, we argue that most importantly, people, and especially parents, are likely to be more supportive of immigration for elder care than they are for childcare. Childcare combines physical care – having someone at home or elsewhere who can keep the person needing care fed and safe – with investment in childhood education. It is this educational component of childcare, particularly in countries in which the portal to a good job is small and education-contingent, that will likely make people less supportive of immigration for care-giving than for elder care and perhaps for immigration in general.

Both the U.S. and Japan are knowledge economies that require high levels of human capital for successful careers. Within these countries, we expect more highly educated respondents in both countries to place a higher premium on the education of their children.

Parents typically want their children to be as educated as themselves if not more so (Davis-Kean 2005; Spera, Wentzel and Matto 2009; Tynkkynen, Vuori and Salmela-Aro 2012; Sosu 2014). More educated respondents may be less willing to hire an immigrant to take care of their children; and even among less educated respondents, respondents who think that education is important either for the labor market or the marriage market are less likely to be enthusiastic about outsourcing the care of their children to immigrants.

Cross-national variation in the kind of education deemed most important for their children can be explained by differences in labor markets. Education is strongly correlated with several economic outcomes including earnings (Tyler, Murnane and Willett 2017), although there are significant differences in the size of the returns to education across space and over time. A growing number of studies examines possible linkages between education outcomes and the labor market (e.g., DiPrete et al. 2017). These studies point to several factors in shaping the impact of education on occupational status. First, scholars distinguish between "tracked" and "untracked" systems (Van de Werfhorst and Mijs 2010; Bol and Van de Werfhorst 2013). At one end, countries such as the U.S. or the U.K. have one comprehensive education system with almost all students attending academic programs in both primary and secondary school. In the U.S., a student's academic record and/or the recommendation of a feeder school is only used for about a third of the students (OECD 2013, 284). Although Japan's educational system is typically viewed to "track" its students to a greater extent than that of the U.S., studies typically classify both the American and Japanese systems as relatively "untracked" systems which place a premium on general skills to a greater extent than specific skills (Bol and Van de Werfhorst 2013; Bol et al. 2014; Forster, Bol and van de Werfhorst 2016).[2]

More important for occupational status is the structure of the labor market. We argue

[2] As of 2015, 7.6% of Japan's high school students were in technical programs (Monbu Kagakusho [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology - Japan] 2016). But 14.4% of graduates from these programs went on to college. This is of course lower than the 64.1% of general high school graduates who went on to attend college, but the figures suggest that the technical track is by no means a "dead end" in terms of further opportunities in general education.

that the concern over getting children into the "right" schools is driven primarily by the fluidity or rigidity of the labor market. Among developed economies, both the U.S. and Japan are typically seen to have relatively low levels of labor market regulation (e.g. OECD n.d.). But in practice, low levels of labor market regulation do not necessarily mean high labor mobility. For instance, as of 2012, 27.2% of American workers had been with their job or company for more than ten years, compared to 47.0% in Japan (calculated from OECD n.d.). In Japan, where employees (at least of large firms) are expected to rise through the ranks via seniority advancement and where inter-firm labor mobility is relatively low, getting into an excellent "right job" the first time around requires placing into the best school possible. Second and third chances at the labor market tend to be inferior. The U.S. labor market also places a relatively high premium on education, but because the U.S. has one of the most fluid labor markets in the world, there is wider scope for workers to pick and choose the elements of human capital in which they wish to invest.

Workers, once they are hired, are more likely to invest in firm-specific skills in countries with high employment protection such as Japan (Estevez-Abe, Iversen and Soskice 2001; Iversen and Stephens 2008). But prior to hiring, citizens in countries with low labor market mobility also have an incentive to invest in education to acquire general skills so that they look attractive to the large firms in which they seek job security. Given the high stakes of education in the labor market – the one shot at a great job upon graduation – we expect Japanese respondents will care a great deal about right kind of early childhood investment to improve their children's chances for a successful career.[3]

We also expect that labor markets will affect the values that parents seek to instill in their children. In a fluid labor market like the U.S., workers with creativity and initiative have a better chance taking advantage of opportunities that bode well for long term career success. By contrast, preparation for rigid labor markets like Japan's include an early and

[3] One measure in the World Values Survey suggests that Japanese care about education more than Americans. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides a ranking with OECD countries.

well-drilled acceptance of one's place in a hierarchy. They must be patient to reap long term rewards, and they must be harmonious with others given the fixity of one's peers.

The importance of the values caregivers help to inculcate, while of direct import to parents, are likely to permeate throughout society as well. Norms become internalized and transmitted across generations without explicit strategic calculus, so that non-parents are likely to have similar expectations of immigrant caregivers; and the expectations towards immigrant caregivers are likely to apply to elder-care as well as to childcare. Although this indirect effect of norms could be lower in the U.S. given a greater heterogeneity of norms in the first place, it remains to be seen how much families' attitudes reflect instrumentalist calculation on behalf of their children or an expression of generalized and unexamined social norms.

Respondents, we suspect, will be generally less supportive of immigration for childcare than for elder care, but our argument suggests that they should not view all immigrants equally. Following the literature on support for immigration, we expect respondents to more enthusiastic about immigrants with higher levels of education and who are more proficient in the native language (Harell et al. 2012; Goldstein and Peters 2014*a*; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015*a*). This effect should be amplified in Japan, where language mastery is essential to educational success, and where natives view the language to be difficult for foreigners to learn.

Immigrants' country of origin may affect the level of support for immigration insofar as some sender countries are perceived to have low levels of education. It stands to reason, moreover, that these preferences will be stronger when it comes to childcare workers. Nonetheless, some U.S. parents, especially those who are highly educated and liberal, may be eager for their children to acquire foreign languages, and therefore might favor immigrants who are from countries whose languages are used worldwide such as Chinese and Spanish. In Japan, immigrants who can speak English may be more valued. Strained diplomatic

relations between pairs of countries might also matter, causing, for example, Japanese to disfavor immigrant helpers from China and Korea under current circumstances.

Respondents' generalized level of trust may play a role as well. Trust plays an important role in individuals' decisions to outsource domestic labor because care is often provided when the consumer of the service is not present, thus creating problems of monitoring (De Ruijter, Van Der Lippe and Raub 2003). In societies like Japan where educational and labor market systems establish well defined tracks for assessment, evaluation, and advancement, we are likely to find lower levels of generalized trust (Hechter and Kanazawa 1993). It is an intriguing irony that social transparency and enforcement produce high levels of behavioral conformity, thereby undermining the need for individuals to develop ways of gauging trustworthiness in others. High levels of assurance, from incentivized conformity, reduce levels of generalized trust. On the other hand, *ceteris paribus*, societies that have higher levels of generalized trust should be more willing to entrust the caring of children and the elderly to strangers. Studies typically find higher levels of generalized trust in the U.S. than in Japan (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994), a difference we expect to carry over to the care of very young children.

Finally, we measure support for general immigration as a baseline to compare support for immigration for caregiving. We are agnostic as to whether respondents will view immigration for the purposes of assistance with childcare and elder care more or less positively than immigration in general. On the one hand, respondents may favor immigration for childcare or elder care because the hypothetical immigrants would be replacing, in many cases, unpaid labor rather than displacing existing jobs. Furthermore, because the hypothetical immigrant would be coming for a specific position, it is less likely s/he would end up as a burden on the social welfare state. On the other hand, respondents may believe that family members should take care of elderly relatives and/or that mothers should take care of their own children and therefore oppose immigration for care-giving on those grounds. We would expect those beliefs to be held disproportionately by older and more conservative respondents.

Hypotheses

From our theoretical discussion, we can summarize our main observable implications. Given our expectation that parents generally emphasize an educational component for childcare more than for elderly care, we derived the following hypotheses:

H1: Support for immigration for elder care will be higher than for childcare.

We also expect that Japanese families compared to American ones aim to prepare their children for bigger hurdles to get an ideal job, and we thus derive the following hypotheses:

H1a: Given the differences in the labor markets between the two countries, the difference in support levels for immigration between elderly care and childcare will be larger in Japan than in the U.S.

Alternatively, because parents generally have an incentive to invest in their children's human capital (from H1), the levels of support may be similar in both countries. But even if this is the case, we expect to find that different labor market conditions lead to different "types" of human capital that people emphasize. More specifically, Japanese, who face rigid labor markets, should favor immigrants with values that are consistent with success in vertical hierarchies such as hard work and respectfulness. American families, by contrast, will favor immigrants with values promoting creativity and resourcefulness in fluid markets. From this, we expect the following to be true:

H1b: Given the differences in the labor markets between the two countries, Japanese respondents will prefer immigrants who value hard work and show respect to the elderly, while American respondents will prefer immigrants who value creativity and independence.

Finally, in both countries, if preferences are based on instrumental calculations, parents will have stronger preferences than the general population for immigrants with values that are appreciated on the labor market and/or they will prefer immigrants for elder care than for child care. Or these values may diffuse through society, even if their origin is in strategies for economic success. Thus, we expect:

H2a: The above hypotheses are more likely to capture the attitudes of parents and grandparents than of other respondents.

H2b: The attitudes of parents and grandparents compared to those of other respondents are similar in terms of support for immigration for child care and elderly care.

Data and Methods

To test our hypotheses, we ran original surveys in the United States and Japan. The two surveys are high-quality opt-in Internet based, nationally representative surveys.[4] The U.S. survey was conducted by *YouGov/Polimetrics* in late November 2016 (after the presidential election) and included 1,621 participants from their panel. The survey in Japan was conducted by *Nikkei Research* in July 2016 and included 2,200 randomly chosen participants from their panel.

Prior to fielding the survey, a pre-test of the questions was completed using 100 *Mechanical Turk* sample in the U.S. and 100 CrowdWorks sample in Japan. We registered a pre-analysis plan based on the results of the pre-test.

[4] We sampled both data at least along the following demographic variables: age, gender, residential locations, and income level.

Survey Questions

To examine our hypotheses, we employed a conjoint method that allows us to reduce social desirability bias (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). The main test of our argument focuses on nine conjoint analyses.[5] Three of the conjoints examined opinions on immigration for childcare; three examined opinions on immigration for eldercare; and three examined general immigration. The question wording on immigration for childcare was as follows:[6]

> *Hypothetically speaking, if the government created a program that would allow citizens to sponsor an immigrant worker to help with at-home childcare, would you be willing to hire either, neither, or both of the following two candidates?*

The question wording for immigration for elder care was:

> *Hypothetically speaking, if the government created a program that would allow citizens to sponsor an immigrant worker to help with at-home elder care, would you be willing to hire either, neither, or both of the following two candidates?*

The question wording for immigration in general was:

> *Hypothetically speaking, which of these two candidates should generally be allowed to immigrate to the US [Japan]?*

For each of the conjoints, we randomly varied the *same* values of the attributes shown in Table 1, so that we can focus on estimating the effects of child caretaker and elderly caretaker within each country, while controlling for country-level observable and unobservable factors.

[5] The survey instrument that contains all the questions in English and Japanese are available upon request.

[6] Because some respondents may not prefer to accommodate any immigrants, we chose a unforced choice design and respondents answered one of the following alternatives: hire one of the candidates; hire both candidates, and hire neither of them.

Because populations are different, we cannot directly compare the estimates across the two countries. Therefore, to test our cross-country hypotheses, we indirectly compare the difference in the within-country estimates between the child and elderly caretakers across the two countries. In other words, we use the estimate for the elderly care conjoint as a baseline for each country.[7] The specific question wording allows us to examine respondents' individual, not sociotropic, attitudes about accommodating immigrants. Below, we provide tests about whether respondents answered the questions based on individual needs of caregiving, not collective needs.

[7] This also controls for the willingness to outsource caregiving. Although it is not a perfect measure, the difference between the estimates between the general immigrants and elder care may suggest the willingness to outsource.

Table 1: Attributes and Values in Conjoint Analysis

Attributes	*Values*
Country of Origin	U.S.: Mexico, Philippines, Romania, India, China Japan: Korea, China, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam
Gender	Male Female
Education	U.S.: Less than high school, High school, Some college, College, Graduate degree Japan: Primary or secondary school, Vocational college, High school, College, Graduate school
Training in Industry	Yes No
Language	U.S.: Little English, Some English, Proficient in English Japan: No Japanese; no English, No Japanese; fluent English, Fluent Japanese; no English, Fluent Japanese; fluent English
Planned Length of Stay	1 year, 1–2 years, 2–5 years, More than 5 years
Reason of stay	To gain experience, To live in the U.S./Japan permanently,[a] To support family back home
Important values	U.S.: Creativity, Education, Hard work, Independence, Kindness, Obedience, Responsibility, Religious, Well-mannered Japan: Creativity, Education, Hard work, Independence, Kindness, Obedience, Responsibility, Respect for elders, Quiet and helpful (meaning thoughtfulness and attentiveness)

[a]Note: if the respondent saw this value, length of stay was constrained to be more than 5 years.

Results

Baseline Support for Immigration

First, we examine support for immigration across three categories of workers – childcare workers, elder care workers, and general immigrants – across the U.S. and Japan. Table 2 presents, for both countries, the percentage of immigrant profiles chosen for hire or allowed into the country in each category. As predicted, respondents in both samples are less supportive of childcare immigrants than of elder care immigrants or of general immigrants.[8] This is consistent with H1. Support for general immigration is about the same in both countries. This is somewhat surprising given that Japan is thought to be more anti-immigration than the U.S., and given Japan's much more restrictive policies towards immigration. American openness to immigration apparently has more to with the desire of business to keep down the cost of labor than with the views of natives.

In both the U.S. and Japan, there is less support for immigration any kind of care work, including elder care, than for general immigration[9]. We found little difference, in fact, between American and Japanese respondents in the enthusiasm for care workers from abroad, which is not consistent with H1a.

Table 2: Support for Immigration by Country and Category of Immigrant

Country	Childcare (a)	Elder Care (b)	Difference (a-b)	General
US	42.79%	46.05%	-3.26%	54.65 %
Japan	38.59%	41.70%	-3.11%	53.71%

Notes: Percentages are calculated as the % of all profiles chosen to be hired or allowed into the country.

[8]The differences are both statistically significant at the 1% level: $t = 4.313$ for the U.S. sample and $t = 5.145$ for the Japanese sample. The results also remain similar when we limit the sample to those who have children or elderly relatives to take care of. See Table A.2 in the Appendix.

[9]The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level: $t = 11.346$ for the U.S. sample and $t = 19.707$ for the Japanese sample.

Favored Attributes of Immigrants

Figure 1 presents the results for childcare, elder care, and general immigrants. Each graph presents the results, by country, of three different conjoint experiments: the top (blue) line for attribute is the 95% confidence interval for the general immigrant experiment; the middle (green) line is the interval for the elder care immigrant; and the bottom (red) line is the interval for the childcare immigrant.

Figure 1: Results of the Conjoint Analysis: Cross-national Comparison



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample. The reference level for each attribute is not reported.

First, we find that both American and Japanese respondents prefer immigrants with better education, more training, and better language proficiency for all three categories of

immigrants; this is consistent with prior research.[10] In both countries, the point estimate on education was higher for general immigrants than for either childcare or elder care immigrants, although the difference is not statistically significant at the 95% level. The preference for skill levels and training did not significantly differ among categories of immigrants either. In terms of language, there are some differences among the three categories. American respondents were more concerned that elder care immigrants speak proficient English than that general immigrants do so, suggesting a premium on communication with the elderly. Japanese respondents were generally more concerned than American respondents about language skills, especially for elder care but for childcare and general immigration as well. Moving from "no Japanese and no English" to "fluent Japanese but no English" increases support for an immigrant by 30% or more across all categories. Japanese most prefer immigrants who speak both Japanese and English fluently, in particular, for elderly care. Finally, respondents appear not to use immigrants' countries of origin as an information shortcut to gauge an immigrant's own education.

Overall, we find striking similarities in the preferences for all the three categories of immigrants both in the U.S. and Japan. Given that the overall support level for immigrants is the lowest for childcare, the results suggest two-stage decision making – people first decide whether or not they are willing to outsource a particular task to an immigrant and then, if willing, choose similar types of well-educated immigrants for all tasks.

We now turn to heterogeneous treatment effects. First, Figure 2 splits the sample by gender of respondent and examines the results of the conjoint for childcare immigrants. In each country, the point estimate on higher levels of education, language proficiency, and training tends to be higher for women than for men, although few of differences are statistically significant. In contrast, there is relatively little difference in preference for education, language, and training across genders for elder care or general immigrants (Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix). These results suggest that women bear more of the responsibility

[10] See for example Goldstein and Peters (2014*b*); Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015*b*).

and costs of their children's education and evaluate immigrant childcare workers with that in mind.

These results are not affected by respondents' ideas about the proper role for mothers. For American and Japanese respondents alike, the preference for educated immigrants extended to both those disapproving of working mothers and those approving (Figure A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix).[11] This finding suggests that indirect norm diffusion may be at work because even those who are unlikely to support any immigrant childcare workers still would hire a similar type of childcare worker as those who are most likely to use one.

Figure 2: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Childcare Immigrants by Respondents' Gender



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure 3 presents the effects of the importance of education on preferences over immi-

[11] See also Table A.3 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics for the measure.

gration and suggests that preferences for more educated child care workers are driven by the subset of respondents who think that education is important, in particular in the U.S. However, similar results were also found for the elderly care and general immigrants (see Figures A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix)[12]

Figure 3: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Childcare Immigrants by Respondents' Idea about Education



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

In summary, many of the differences in preferences over immigration are not simply held by those most in need of family care but instead seem to pervade society more generally. We found little difference in the types of attributes favored by whether or not respondents had

[12]Results are similar when the sample is split by education attainment of the respondent; see Figures A.7 and A.8 in the Appendix. We find that more educated natives prefer more educated immigrants across the board. We also find that preferences for immigrants who speak the native language fluently is high for all types of respondents.

children (Figures A.9 and A.10 in the Appendix); whether they took care of elderly relatives (Figure A.11 in the Appendix); or, somewhat surprisingly, whether they had had problems finding daycare or elder care personally or knew someone who had (Figures A.12 and A.13 in the Appendix). This suggests that parents, those who take care of elderly relatives, and those who cannot find care for their children or elderly relatives are unwilling to lower their standards just to ensure that their relative is looked after. Similarly, we found few differences by political party affiliation (Figures A.14 and A.15 in the Appendix). Rather, when determining what kinds of immigrants they favored, those most in need of help uphold the values of society or are even more likely to demand higher standards to ensure their child has the "right" skills and their elderly relatives have the "right" care. This is more consistent with H2b than H2a.

Immigrants' Values

The most significant differences between the two countries was in the *values* that caregiving immigrants are expected to possess. Career success in knowledge economies requires high levels of education, but the flexible and rigid variants of knowledge economies reward different character traits that are learned in early childhood. We find measurable differences between American and Japanese respondents in the values they wished to see in immigrant caregivers, as well as in immigrants more generally.

Figure 1 shows that American respondents favored childcare workers who were creative, responsible, hardworking, kind, and well-mannered. Elder care workers needed only to be kind. American respondents also valued responsible, hardworking, kind, and well-mannered immigrants overall, although not all of these preferences are significant at the 95% level. The American preference for creativity for childcare workers but not for other immigrants suggests a desire to instill in their children attributes widely presumed to be labor market assets.

Japanese respondents want childcare workers who are hardworking, kind, quiet and helpful, and well-mannered and, although not quite at significant at the 95% level, childcare workers who care about education. Japanese want elder care workers who are responsible, kind, obedient, quiet and helpful, well-mannered, and respectful. Japanese respondents wanted general immigrants to be hardworking, quiet and helpful, well-mannered, and educated (although not quite at the 95% level). Japanese respondents did not single out creativity for any group of immigrants.

Other Findings

In both the U.S. and Japan, respondents favored female immigrants to male immigrants in all categories and especially for childcare and to some extent elder care. As for country of origin, U.S. respondents preferred Filipino elder care workers, although our data do not permit us to attribute this preference to the prevalence of Filipino nurses in the U.S. or attribute the prevalence to a prior preference.[13] Country of origin had its second strongest effect in Japan after the language skills: in all categories, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Indonesian, and Brazilians of Japanese origin are preferred to Koreans or Chinese immigrants, on which we blame the diplomatic tensions between Japan and these East Asian neighbors. For reasons to be explored, Japanese respondents slightly prefer Korean immigrants to Chinese immigrants for elder care and general immigration but not for childcare. In both the U.S. and Japan, respondents seem to prefer assimilationist immigrants who are willing to put down roots and stay for more than five years.

[13] Goldstein and Peters (2014*b*) that finds that Mexican immigrants face the greatest level of opposition in the US.

Conclusion

We began with a striking fact: a country's demographic need for replacement workers correlates poorly with welcoming attitudes towards immigrants. The importance of human capital for career success in both the U.S. and Japan elevates the importance of early childcare education, which can saddle mothers with a large responsibility for their young children.

American and Japanese respondents share a strong preference educated caregivers, but they differ over which values they wish caregivers to hold. This difference appears to reflect, at least in part, judgments about what values are career-relevant in their respective countries. Navigating fluid American labor markets requires creativity, whereas thoughtfulness and attentiveness towards others are more valuable in the hierarchical organizations to which a Japanese worker aspires. For Americans, the premium on creativity shows up only for childcare immigrants and not for elder care workers or for general immigrants. For Japanese, creativity was not a desired attribute for any type of immigrants, including those caring for children. These results suggest that, whether instrumentally or by reflex, responsible and loving parents seek to arm their children with the most relevant attitudes for success in the context as they understand it.

Apart from labor market incentives to favor identifiable clusters of values in childcare workers, we also find pervasive spillovers into generalized social norms. While pure calculation may magnify the importance of these norms on behalf of young children, we find that Japanese value thoughtfulness and attentiveness to others for all kinds of immigrants, suggesting that the norms are deeply held and widely shared. Material interests may have germinated the norms, but the norms have taken on a life of their own.

Japan's labor markets are becoming more flexible, by sheer dint of necessity: with higher levels of economic integration, large firms offer fewer long term labor contracts relative to the pool of workers, and a growing portion of the Japanese workforce faces fluidity and vulnerability. If we are right, socialized values may adapt to changes in the labor market.

As Rindfuss, Brewster and Kavee (1996) have shown for the U.S., new values (the acceptance of working mothers) radiated out in concentric circles from those who most need to adopt new values. But to the extent that the values of high-status members of society are more resistant to change and tend to be emulated, norm change can be countervailed, stalled, or fought effectively.[14]

Our research highlights how hard it is for governments to overcome their demographic problems solely by admitting more immigrant caregivers. Natives, even those most in need of help with care giving, are unwilling to hire an immigrant caregiver unless they have high levels of education, speak the language, and hold the right values. Most would-be immigrants, meanwhile, have relatively low levels of formal education and, in the case of Japan, are unlikely to speak the language. Nonetheless, there are steps governments can take. Japan has already signed bilateral labor agreements with the Philippines to provide cultural and language training for immigrant caregivers prior to their arrival in Japan (Peters 2017). More programs like this might go a long way to easing the care giving burden.

[14] See also Alesina, Giuliano and Nunn (2013).

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Appendix

Table A.1: Country Ranking by the Importance of Education

Country	Percentage	N
Netherlands	0.23	1001
Sweden	0.25	908
Australia	0.32	1394
United States	0.32	2184
New Zealand	0.35	715
Germany	0.41	1586
Slovenia	0.42	947
Poland	0.47	835
Spain	0.55	1122
Estonia	0.64	1435
Chile	0.69	944
Japan	0.71	2079
Turkey	0.76	994
South Korea	0.85	1160
Mexico	0.92	1996

Note: The data come from the Wave 6 of World Values Survey. The question asks: "To what degree are you worried about the following situations? – Not being able to give my children a good education" We report the percentage of respondents who answered "Very much" and "A good deal."

Table A.2: Support for Immigration by Country and Category of Immigrant (Relevant Respondents Only)

Country	Childcare	Elder Care	General
U.S.	40.09%	44.14%	52.19%
Japan	37.46%	41.79%	53.34%

Notes: Percentages are calculated as the % of all profiles chosen to be hired or allowed into the country. We report those who have children for the Childcare conjoint; those who elderly relatives for the Elder Care conjoint; and those who have children and elderly relatives for the General conjoint.

Table A.3: Ideal Employment Status with Children by Gender

Country	Full-time employment	Part-time employment	Stay at home
U.S. (women)	27.09%	42.76%	29.18 %
U.S. (men)	68.94%	21.66%	8.15 %
Japan (women)	34.00%	40.50%	25.50%
Japan (men)	89.32%	6.41%	4.27%

Table A.4: Household Status: Who Are You Living with?

Country	Children	Grandchildren	Extended family
U.S.	36.77%	33.29%	14.28%
Japan	35.23%	14.36%	51.77%

Table A.5: Past Experience about Child Care and Elder Care

Country	Difficulty (childcare)	Difficulty (elder care)	Experience (elderly)
U.S.	51.36%	38.63%	27.20 %
Japan	18.59%	16.18%	10.05%

Figure A.1: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Elder Care by Respondents' Gender



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.2: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for General Immigrants by Respondents' Gender



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.3: Results of the Conjoint Analysis by Respondents' Idea about Women's Employment Status with Children (U.S.)



Figure A.4: Results of the Conjoint Analysis by Respondents' Idea about Women's Employment Status with Children (Japan)

(a) Childcare (b) Elder care (c) General



Figure A.5: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Elder Care Immigrants by Respondents' Idea about Education



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.6: Results of the Conjoint Analysis of General Immigration by Respondents' Idea about Education



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.7: Results of the Conjoint Analysis: Cross-national Comparison by Respondents' Education – Above Some College (U.S.)



Figure A.8: Results of the Conjoint Analysis: Cross-national Comparison by Respondents' Education – Above Some College (Japan)



Figure A.9: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Childcare Immigrants by Respondents' Children Status

(a) U.S.

(b) Japan



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.10: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Elder Care Immigrants by Respondents' Children Status



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.11: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Elder Care Immigrants by Respondents who Take Care of Elderly Relatives



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.12: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Childcare Immigrants by Respondents' Difficulty in Finding Daycare



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.13: Results of the Conjoint Analysis for Elder Care Immigrants by Respondents' Difficulty in Finding Nursing Home

(a) U.S. (b) Japan



Note: The left column contains the results from the U.S. sample, and the right column contains the results from the Japanese sample.

Figure A.14: Results of the Conjoint Analysis by Respondents' Party Affiliation (U.S.)



Figure A.15: Results of the Conjoint Analysis by Respondents' Party Affiliation (Japan)